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Note
GILES v. CALIFORNIA: FORFEITING JUSTICE INSTEAD OF
CONFRONTATION RIGHTS IN THE COURT’S MOST RECENT
FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING JURISPRUDENCE
STEPHANIE BIGNON*
In Giles v. California,1 the Supreme Court of the United States
considered whether a defendant whose wrongful act has made a wit-
ness unavailable to testify at trial forfeits his Sixth Amendment right to
confront that witness.2  The Court concluded that a defendant forfeits
his confrontation right only when a witness is absent because the de-
fendant has sought to prevent the witness from testifying.3  By mistak-
enly focusing on a historical analysis in reaching this conclusion,4 a
plurality of the Court conflated a waiver rationale with the equitable
principles underlying the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine5 and fur-
thermore inadequately addressed the utilitarian principles that influ-
ence the application of the doctrine.6  If the plurality had considered
these equitable and utilitarian principles, it would have instead pos-
ited a knowledge-based intent standard and would not have needed to
retreat from its opinion.7
I. THE CASE
On the evening of September 29, 2002, Dwayne Giles shot and
killed Brenda Avie, his former girlfriend, outside his grandmother’s
Copyright  2010 by Stephanie Bignon.
* Stephanie Bignon is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of
Law where she is a staff member for the Maryland Law Review.  The author extends special
thanks to Professor Jana Singer and Lindsay Goldberg, Executive Notes & Comments Edi-
tor, for their insightful feedback and guidance.  She would also like to thank her family for
their unfailing encouragement and support.
1. 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
2. Id. at 2681.
3. See id. at 2683, 2693 (explaining that the common-law forfeiture by wrongdoing
doctrine applied only when a defendant’s conduct was “designed” to prevent a witness
from testifying and that the Court would not approve a doctrine broader than the one
existing at common law).
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part IV.C.
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home.8  Shortly after Avie arrived at the home that evening, Giles’s
niece, Veronica Smith, heard Avie yell “Granny” several times, fol-
lowed by a series of gunshots.9  When Smith ran outside, she found
Giles holding a handgun and Avie bleeding on the ground.10  Avie,
who was not carrying a weapon at the time, had been shot multiple
times in the torso, and two of her wounds proved fatal.11  Giles fled
from the scene but was eventually apprehended by the police.12
At his trial, Giles admitted to shooting Avie, but claimed that he
had done so in self-defense.13  He claimed that he and Avie, whom he
described as a jealous woman, had a tumultuous relationship, which
he had tried unsuccessfully to end.14  Giles testified that Avie
threatened to kill him and Tameta Munks, his new girlfriend, when
Avie arrived at his grandmother’s home that evening.15  Maintaining
that he feared for his safety during this conversation, Giles testified
that he retrieved a gun from the garage and that Avie “charged” him
as he started walking back into the house.16
Several weeks prior to Avie’s shooting, police officers had investi-
gated a separate report of domestic violence involving Giles and Avie
after responding to a domestic disturbance call.17  While speaking pri-
vately with one of the officers, Avie explained that Giles had accused
her of having an affair before starting to choke and punch her.18  She
had also stated that, during this encounter, Giles took out a folding
knife and threatened to kill her if he found out that she had cheated
on him.19
8. People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 844–45 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
9. Id. at 845. According to Marie Banks, a friend of Avie and Giles, Avie seemed angry
when she came to the home that evening. Id. at 846. Banks testified that she left the home
with Avie shortly before the shooting, but that Avie returned because she saw Giles’s new
girlfriend arriving at the home. Id.
10. Id. at 845.
11. Id. One of Avie’s wounds was consistent with her holding up her hand when Giles
shot her, one was consistent with her turning to her side when she was shot, and one was
consistent with her being shot while she was lying on the ground. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. In addition, Giles claimed that Avie had previously vandalized his home and
car, shot someone, and threatened someone with a knife. Id.
15. Id. at 845–46.  Giles also testified that he had argued with Avie earlier that day after
Avie discovered that Munks would be at his grandmother’s home that evening. Id. at 845.
He insisted that Avie first threatened to harm Munks during this conversation. Id.
16. Id. at 845–46.
17. Id. at 846.
18. Id. At trial, the officer who had spoken with Avie testified that Avie was crying when
the police arrived on the scene. Id.
19. Id.
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Over Giles’s objection, the trial court admitted Avie’s statements
to the officer from that night.20  The jury convicted Giles of first de-
gree murder.21  Applying the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine,22 the
California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision and held
that Giles forfeited his right to confront Avie at trial because his own
criminal violence had made her unavailable for cross-examination.23
The Supreme Court of California affirmed the Court of Appeal’s deci-
sion on the same ground.24  Emphasizing the equitable principles un-
derlying the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, the court explained
that the doctrine applies when a defendant’s wrongful act causes a
witness’s absence at trial, even if the defendant did not seek to silence
the witness.25  The Supreme Court of the United States granted certio-
rari to determine whether a defendant forfeits his confrontation right
when the defendant’s own wrongdoing has made a witness unavaila-
ble to testify.26
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Three factors have shaped courts’ interpretation of forfeiture by
wrongdoing, a doctrine grounded in the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution: (1) historical standards; (2) the equitable
rationale underlying the doctrine; and (3) utilitarian principles im-
pacting the doctrine’s application.  First, courts have considered pre-
cedent to find that the forfeiture doctrine was historically invoked
when a defendant wrongfully procured a witness’s absence from
trial.27  In addition, courts have frequently examined the theory un-
derlying the forfeiture doctrine, recently reiterating that equitable
principles form its basis.28  Finally, courts have also looked to utilita-
rian principles when applying the forfeiture doctrine to ensure that its
20. Id.  The trial court admitted Avie’s statements pursuant to a hearsay exception in
California’s evidence code, which allows the admission of certain out-of-court statements
that describe the infliction of physical injury upon a witness when that witness is unavaila-
ble to testify at trial and the statements are deemed trustworthy. Id.; CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1370 (West Supp. 2009).
21. People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 437 (Cal. 2007).
22. This doctrine is also referred to throughout this Note as “forfeiture,” the “forfei-
ture doctrine,” and the “doctrine.”
23. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 851–52.  Although the trial court did not address the issue
of forfeiture, the California Court of Appeal utilized the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine
because neither the prosecution nor the defense disputed that Giles’s actions had ren-
dered Avie unavailable to testify. Giles, 152 P.3d at 437.
24. Giles, 152 P.3d at 443, 446–47.
25. Id. at 442.
26. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2681 (2008).
27. See infra Part II.A.
28. See infra Part II.B.
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use comports with principles of truth-seeking and the effective admin-
istration of justice.29
A. Historical Considerations Inform the Modern Forfeiture Doctrine
Courts interpreting the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine have
long considered historical standards, employing the forfeiture doc-
trine when a defendant has wrongfully procured a witness’s absence
from trial.  The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.”30  Known as the Confrontation
Clause, this guarantee ensures that witnesses against a defendant will
testify under oath at trial, where the defendant can cross-examine
them and the jury can observe their demeanor.31  The Supreme Court
of the United States, however, has long recognized the forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine as an exception to a defendant’s confrontation
right.32
Under the forfeiture doctrine, a defendant may forfeit his right
to confront a witness against him when the witness is absent from the
defendant’s trial as a result of the defendant’s own wrongful procure-
ment.33  The doctrine originated in Lord Morley’s Case,34 a 1666 deci-
sion by the English House of Lords.35  In that case, a defendant
objected when the prosecution attempted to introduce the testimony
of an absent witness.36  The court held that when a witness was de-
tained “by means or procurement”37 of the defendant, the court
could admit the witness’s prior statement38 even though the defen-
dant would not have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at
29. See infra Part II.C.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
31. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir. 1976).
32. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1879) (“The Constitution does not
guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own wrongful
acts.”).
33. Id.
34. 6 How. St. Tr. 769 (H.L. 1666).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 776.
37. Id. at 771.
38. The Supreme Court has held that the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimo-
nial statements.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).  Thus, if a statement is
nontestimonial, it is exempted from Confrontation Clause scrutiny entirely. Id.  The Court
recently explained that a statement is testimonial when the circumstances objectively
demonstrate that there is no ongoing emergency and that the primary reason for the inter-
rogation is to establish past actions that might be relevant to later criminal prosecution.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
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trial.39  Applying this new doctrine to the case at bar, the court upheld
the defendant’s objection, noting that although the evidence indi-
cated that the witness had run away prior to trial, the evidence failed
to demonstrate that the witness had done so because of the defen-
dant’s actions.40
In the 1775 case of Rex v. Barber,41 an American court echoed the
forfeiture doctrine developed in Lord Morley’s Case.  In Rex, the defen-
dant’s friend, at the defendant’s request, sent away a witness after the
witness provided preliminary testimony in a case against the defen-
dant for counterfeiting.42  The court admitted other witnesses to con-
vey the absent witness’s testimony, noting that such evidence was
admissible where the defendant “procured a witness to go away.”43
Similarly, in Drayton v. Wells,44 the court considered whether to admit
a witness’s prior testimony when the witness claimed that he could no
longer recall the event about which the defendant had called him to
testify.45  The court concluded that the witness’s memory lapse did not
fall within one of the established Confrontation Clause exceptions,
one of which was the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.46  Explaining
that the forfeiture doctrine applied only where a witness was absent by
the defendant’s “contrivance,” the court reasoned that admitting the
witness’s testimony in this situation would create an unnecessary ad-
ministrative burden for future courts.47
The Supreme Court first addressed the forfeiture doctrine in the
1878 case of Reynolds v. United States.48  In Reynolds, the defendant, on
trial for bigamy, objected to the introduction of his second wife’s
prior testimony after concealing her location so that she could not
39. Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. at 770–71.
40. Id. at 777.
41. 1 Root 76 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1775).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 409 (1819).
45. Id. at 410.  The Drayton case involved a contract dispute, and the witness had testi-
fied at the defendant’s first trial, where the jury found for the plaintiff. Id. at 409–10.  At
the defendant’s new trial, the witness stated that he remembered almost nothing about the
contracting parties’ discussion about the contract’s terms, but insisted that his previous
testimony was “certainly true.” Id. at 410.
46. Id. at 411 (noting that the only other Confrontation Clause exceptions were a wit-
ness’s death, insanity, and unavailability because “he was beyond seas”).
47. See id. at 411–12 (explaining that if the court admitted the witness’s testimony in
this case, then it would have to consider admitting supplementary testimony in all cases
involving a second examination).
48. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
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testify at his trial.49  The Court rejected the defendant’s contention
that the forfeiture doctrine only applied after a witness had been sum-
moned to testify,50 reasoning that the Sixth Amendment does not pro-
tect a defendant from the “legitimate consequences” of his own
wrongful acts.51  Reflecting on the doctrine established in Lord Morley’s
Case, the Reynolds Court held that a defendant who voluntarily keeps
witnesses away from his trial forfeits the right to confront those
witnesses.52
In 1900, the Court clarified its approach to the forfeiture doc-
trine.  In Motes v. United States,53 one prosecution witness, a former
defendant, escaped from custody and fled after giving preliminary tes-
timony implicating several of his co-defendants in a man’s murder.54
The defendants objected to the introduction of the witness’s prior tes-
timony at their trial, arguing that its introduction violated their con-
frontation rights.55  Sustaining the defendants’ objection, the Court
held that the forfeiture doctrine did not apply unless the witness’s
absence resulted from the “suggestion, procurement or act of the ac-
cused.”56  In so holding, the Motes Court explained that it would not
extend the forfeiture doctrine to include cases where the prosecu-
tion’s negligence, rather than the defendants’ actions, had caused the
witness’s absence.57
B. Equitable Principles Underlie the Modern Forfeiture Doctrine
In addition to historical standards, courts interpreting the forfei-
ture by wrongdoing doctrine have also looked to the doctrine’s under-
49. Id. at 146, 148, 150.  When a deputy arrived at the defendant’s home to subpoena
the defendant’s second wife, the defendant informed the deputy that she was not at home,
that the deputy would have to find out her location, and that she would not appear to
testify against him at trial. Id. at 148–49.
50. Id. at 152.
51. Id. at 158.  In Reynolds, the Court first articulated the equitable basis of the forfei-
ture by wrongdoing doctrine. Id. at 159; see infra Part II.B.1.
52. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159.
53. 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
54. Id. at 467–68.  Specifically, the former defendant claimed that several of his co-
defendants shot and killed the victim after the victim reported the defendants’ illegal pos-
session of a still to a local deputy. Id. at 460–61.
55. Id. at 467, 470.
56. Id. at 471.  In reaching its decision, the Motes Court extensively cited Queen v. Scaife,
(1851) 117 Eng. Rep. 1271 (Q.B.), a case in which an English court refused to apply the
forfeiture doctrine against a group of defendants who had not caused the absence of the
witness. Motes, 178 U.S. at 472–73 (citing Scaife, (1851) 117 Eng. Rep. at 1273).
57. Motes, 178 U.S. at 474.  The Court explained that the prosecution had chosen not
to place the defendant under the guard of a police officer prior to his testimony, but
rather had merely asked another witness to watch over him. Id. at 471.
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lying rationale.  This rationale, however, has shifted over the
centuries.  Although common-law courts historically justified the for-
feiture doctrine using equitable principles,58 some modern American
courts briefly adopted a waiver-based rationale.59  Recently, however,
the Court has confirmed that it evaluates forfeiture cases on equitable
grounds.60
1. Common-Law Courts Based the Forfeiture Doctrine in Equity
In 1692, an English court first acknowledged the principles un-
derlying the forfeiture doctrine in Harrison’s Case.61  In that case, the
court required the prosecution to prove that the defendant had pro-
cured the witness’s unavailability before admitting an absent witness’s
prior testimony.62  Explaining its decision, the court emphasized that
it would not allow the witness’s absence to “conduce to [the defen-
dant’s] advantage.”63
Nearly two centuries later, in Queen v. Scaife,64 another English
court reiterated this principle when it admitted prior witness testi-
mony against a defendant who had obtained a witness’s absence to
prevent the witness’s testimony at trial.65  Examining the theory un-
derlying the forfeiture doctrine, the court reasoned that “justice”
would not permit the defendant to take advantage of his own
wrongdoing.66
The Supreme Court of the United States first recognized this un-
derlying equitable rationale in Reynolds.  Explaining that the forfeiture
doctrine rests both on principles of common honesty and the maxim
that “no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong,”67
58. See infra Part II.B.1.
59. See infra Part II.B.2.
60. See infra Part II.B.2.
61. 12 How. St. Tr. 833 (H.L. 1692).
62. Id. at 851–52.  Specifically, at the defendant’s murder trial, the statement of the
absent witness, a young boy, was read into evidence, demonstrating that the boy had seen
the defendant leaving the coach where the victim was murdered. Id. at 852–53.  A witness
to the young boy’s disappearance testified that three soldiers, believed to have ties to the
defendant, had enticed the boy away before he could testify against the defendant. Id. at
851–52.
63. Id. at 835–36.
64. (1851) 117 Eng. Rep. 1271 (Q.B.).
65. Id. at 1273 (stating that the defendant “had resorted to a contrivance to keep the
witness out of the way”).
66. Id. at 1272 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  The Scaife court, how-
ever, refused to introduce the absent witness’s testimony against two other defendants who
were not involved in procuring the witness’s absence. Id. at 1273.
67. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 159 (1879).
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the Court held that one who procures a witness’s absence forfeits his
constitutional right to confront that witness.68
2. Modern American Courts Briefly Justified the Forfeiture Doctrine
Using a Waiver Rationale Before Returning to Reliance on
Equitable Principles
In the twentieth century, some courts briefly shifted to a waiver
rationale to justify the forfeiture doctrine.  Reliance upon waiver prin-
ciples was short-lived, however, with recent courts reiterating that the
forfeiture doctrine rests in equity.  The Supreme Court first illustrated
the shift to a waiver rationale in Diaz v. United States.69  In this case, the
Court evaluated whether the lower court had violated the defendant’s
confrontation right by admitting testimony from the preliminary in-
vestigation and the defendant’s previous assault and battery trial at his
homicide trial.70  Although it did not base its decision on the tradi-
tional forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine,71 the Diaz Court cited its
decision in Reynolds and claimed that Reynolds served as an illustration
of the waiver theory.72  Discussing the concept of waiver, the Court
indicated that in the present case, the defendant waived his confronta-
tion right by voluntarily placing into evidence the testimony in ques-
tion and thereby seeking to obtain an advantage at trial.73
Similarly, in United States v. Thevis,74 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit relied on a waiver theory in determining
whether a defendant had forfeited his confrontation right by murder-
ing a witness in order to prevent his testimony.75  The court explained
that waiver involved a defendant’s “ ‘intentional relinquishment of a
known right or privilege’”76 and held that the defendant’s murder of
the witness qualified as a waiver, thus causing him to forfeit his con-
68. Id. at 158.
69. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
70. Id. at 449.
71. See id. at 449–51 (explaining that the defendant had waived his confrontation right
because he was the one who had offered the testimony without qualification or
restriction).
72. See id. at 452 (“The view that this [confrontation] right may be waived also was
recognized by this court in Reynolds . . . .” (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158)).
73. Id. at 452–53.
74. 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982).
75. Id. at 621, 630.  Underhill, the witness who had agreed to testify against Thevis, had
previously worked with Thevis in the adult entertainment industry and had knowledge of
an arson in which Thevis was involved. Id. at 622–23.  When Thevis discovered that Un-
derhill planned to testify against him, he allegedly lured Underhill to a secluded location
and shot and killed him. Id. at 624.
76. Id. at 630 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
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frontation right.77  Citing Thevis with approval, the court in United
States v. Rouco78 relied on a waiver theory in finding that a defendant
had forfeited his confrontation right.79  In Rouco, the defendant killed
an undercover agent of the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms (“ATF”) to whom he had previously sold weapons and
supplied a cocaine sample when the agent attempted to apprehend
him.80  At trial, over the defendant’s objection, the court admitted the
agent’s prior statement about obtaining the drugs from the defen-
dant.81  Rejecting the defendant’s objection, the court explained that
a defendant could waive the right to confront a witness and that by
killing the ATF agent, the defendant had “waived” his confrontation
right.82
Recently, however, in Crawford v. Washington,83 the Supreme
Court moved away from reliance on waiver principles as a justification
for the forfeiture doctrine.  The defendant in Crawford stabbed a man
who had tried to rape the defendant’s wife, and the defendant’s wife
witnessed the stabbing.84  At trial, the defendant claimed that he
stabbed the victim because he believed the victim had a weapon, but
the testimony of the defendant’s wife contradicted this claim.85  When
the prosecution attempted to introduce the wife’s out-of-court state-
ments to rebut the defendant’s claim of self-defense, the defendant
claimed that introduction of the statements would violate his confron-
tation right.86  Although the Crawford Court ultimately sustained the
defendant’s objection by excluding the statements,87 it noted that the
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine extinguishes a defendant’s con-
77. See id. (“[W]hen confrontation becomes impossible due to the actions of the very
person who would assert the right, logic dictates that the right has been waived.”).
78. 765 F.2d 983 (11th Cir. 1985).
79. Id. at 995 (citing Thevis, 665 F.2d 616).
80. Id. at 985–86.  At the time of his death, the agent was again engaged in an under-
cover investigation. Id. at 985.  The defendant became suspicious of the deal before the
ATF back-up car arrived at the scene. Id. at 986.  When the defendant attempted to leave
the scene, the agent identified himself as a law enforcement official. Id. at 986–87.  A gun
battle ensued, during which the defendant shot the agent in the head. Id. at 987.
81. Id. at 988, 995.
82. Id. at 995 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Thevis, 665 F.2d at
630).
83. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
84. Id. at 38.
85. Id. at 38–39.  Specifically, the defendant’s wife stated that she had seen no weapon
in the victim’s hands when her husband stabbed him. Id. at 39–40.
86. Id. at 40.  The defendant’s wife could not testify at his trial because of the state
marital privilege doctrine, which bars a spouse from testifying unless the other spouse con-
sents. Id.
87. Id. at 68.  The Court concluded that the wife’s inability to testify solely because of
the marital privilege doctrine was insufficient to fall within the limited founding-era excep-
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frontation right on “essentially equitable grounds.”88  The Court solid-
ified this shift in Davis v. Washington.89  Citing Crawford and Reynolds,
the Davis Court reasoned that the forfeiture doctrine’s equitable basis
ensures that a defendant “who obtains the absence of a witness by
wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.”90
Observing this shift, lower courts have echoed these underlying
equitable principles when applying the forfeiture doctrine.91  For ex-
ample, in United States v. Garcia-Meza,92 a case decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant murdered
his wife following an argument.93  Five months prior to her death, the
defendant’s wife had given testimony to police officers after the defen-
dant violently assaulted her in their home.94  When the prosecution
sought to admit this testimony at trial, the defendant objected, claim-
ing that its admission would violate his confrontation right.95  Reason-
ing that the defendant would derive a benefit from his own
wrongdoing if his wife’s testimony was excluded, the court admitted
the testimony pursuant to the forfeiture doctrine and its underlying
equitable principles.96
tions to the Confrontation Clause, one of which was the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.
Id. at 40, 62, 68.
88. Id. at 62.
89. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
90. Id. at 833 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 36; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1879)).  In Davis, the Court considered whether witness statements to police officers fol-
lowing acts of domestic violence qualified as testimonial. Id. at 817.  After identifying crite-
ria for determining whether a witness’s statement qualified as testimonial, the Court then
considered the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine. Id. at 826–27, 833; see also infra note
111 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing the
forfeiture doctrine’s equitable rationale when admitting the testimony of a witness whom
the defendant had killed); United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966–68 (S.D.
Ohio 2005) (same); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 794–95 (Kan. 2004) (same).
92. 403 F.3d 364.
93. Id. at 366–67.  On the evening of the murder, the defendant and his wife, who were
estranged at the time, attended a party together and became involved in a physical con-
frontation. Id. at 366.  Following the confrontation, the defendant’s wife left the party and
returned to her mother’s home. Id.  Later that night, the defendant burst into the home
and attempted to lure his wife outside. Id. at 367.  When she refused to leave the home,
the defendant attacked and killed her with a kitchen knife. Id.
94. Id. at 367.  The victim told the officers who interviewed her that the defendant had
trapped her in a bathroom, punched her repeatedly, and threatened to kill her because
she had talked to a former boyfriend earlier that day. Id.
95. Id. at 369.
96. Id. at 370–71 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–59 (1879)).  After considering the forfeiture doctrine’s
underlying equitable principles, the Garcia-Meza court explained that the forfeiture doc-
trine applies when a defendant’s wrongful act has caused a witness’s absence from trial—
regardless of whether the defendant intended to prevent the witness from testifying. Id.
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C. Utilitarian Principles Influence the Application of the Modern
Forfeiture Doctrine
Courts have long considered utilitarian principles—such as the
integrity of trial proceedings and the truth-seeking function of the ju-
diciary—when interpreting exceptions to the Confrontation Clause,
including the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.  In 1895, the Su-
preme Court considered these principles in Mattox v. United States97
when the defendant objected to the admission of prior testimony
from two deceased witnesses.98  While emphasizing the importance of
the confrontation right, the Court acknowledged that this right “must
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy.”99  Rejecting
the defendant’s objection to the admission of the statements, the
Court reasoned that while exceptions to the Confrontation Clause ex-
isted in part to protect the rights of the accused, they also existed to
protect the rights of the greater public.100
Following the reasoning in Mattox, lower courts have routinely
employed the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine to protect the integ-
rity of trial proceedings.  In Steele v. Taylor,101 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether to admit the prior
statement of an absent witness in a murder-for-hire case.102  The court
reasoned that the disclosure of pertinent information at trial serves a
“paramount interest” and that interference with that interest, other
than through a legal objection, constitutes a wrongful act.103  Based
on this rationale, the court admitted the absent witness’s testimony
because the evidence showed that the defendants bore a “major re-
97. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
98. Id. at 240.
99. Id. at 243.
100. Id. at 243–44 (“Such exceptions [to the Confrontation Clause] were obviously in-
tended to be respected.  A technical adherence to the letter of a constitutional provision
may occasionally be carried farther than is necessary to the just protection of the accused,
and farther than the safety of the public will warrant.”).
101. 684 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1982).
102. Id. at 1196–97.  In Steele, a state judge hired two brothers to kill his wife because she
would not consent to a divorce. Id. at 1197.  The police suspected the judge following his
wife’s murder, but could not solve the case until seven years later when a witness—a prosti-
tute for one of the brothers—came forward. Id.  After giving inculpatory testimony against
the judge and the two brothers, the witness, who was living with one of the brothers and
had recently had a child with him, recanted her testimony. Id. at 1198.  The trial judge
allowed her prior testimony to be introduced because he was of the opinion that the de-
fendants “had procured her refusal to testify.” Id. at 1199.
103. Id. at 1201 (“[W]rongful conduct obviously includes the use of force and threats,
but it has also been held to include persuasion and control by a defendant [and] the
wrongful nondisclosure of information . . . .”).
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sponsibility for the unavailability of the witness.”104  Similarly, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States
v. Carlson105 reiterated the importance of these utilitarian principles
when admitting an absent witness’s testimony after the defendant had
intimidated the witness to prevent him from testifying.106  To reach its
conclusion, the court considered the significance of maintaining an
effective justice system, noting that the law should not permit a defen-
dant to “subvert a criminal prosecution” by causing the absence of
witnesses who possess inculpatory information.107
In 2006, the Supreme Court affirmed that the forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine serves to protect the truth-seeking function of
the courts in Davis v. Washington.108  Although the Davis opinion fo-
cused on whether a witness’s statement was testimonial and thus sub-
ject to Confrontation Clause scrutiny,109 the Court noted that the
equitable basis of the forfeiture doctrine imposed a duty on defend-
ants to refrain from destroying the integrity of trial proceedings.110
The Supreme Court of Montana, citing Davis with approval, ap-
plied these utilitarian principles to a domestic violence case in State v.
Sanchez.111  In Sanchez, the defendant murdered his ex-girlfriend
104. Id. at 1201–02.  The Steele court also employed the forfeiture doctrine’s equitable
rationale to support its conclusion, explaining that a defendant could not “prefer the law’s
preference and profit from it . . . while repudiating that preference by creating the condi-
tion that prevents it.” Id. at 1202; see supra Part II.B.
105. 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976).
106. Id. at 1359–60.  Carlson, the defendant, was on trial for his participation in a co-
caine distribution scheme. Id. at 1351.  Tindall, one of the men who had purchased co-
caine from Carlson, agreed to testify at trial about Carlson’s illegal activities. Id. at 1352.
The night before the trial began, however, Tindall stated that he feared reprisals if he
testified, explaining that he had received threats from Carlson. Id. at 1352–53.
107. Id. at 1359 (“The question is one of broad public policy, whether an accused per-
son, placed upon trial for crime . . . can with impunity defy the processes of that law,
paralyze the proceedings of courts and juries, and turn them into a solemn farce . . . .”
(quoting Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 443, 458 (1912))).
108. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
109. Id. at 821. Davis involved two cases.  In the first case, a domestic violence victim
called 911 while her boyfriend assaulted her, and she told the operator about the assault.
Id. at 817–18.  In the second case, police responded to a domestic disturbance call and
found the victim alone on the front porch. Id. at 819.  The victim explained that her
husband, who remained inside the home, had attacked her by hitting her and throwing
her down into broken glass. Id. at 820.  The defendants in both cases objected to the
introduction of the victims’ out-of-court statements, claiming that admission would violate
their confrontation right because the statements were testimonial. Id. at 819–20.
110. Id. at 833 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004)).
111. 177 P.3d 444, 447, 454–56 (Mont. 2008) (citing Davis, 547 U.S. 813).  The Sanchez
court also emphasized the forfeiture doctrine’s underlying equitable rationale in reaching
its conclusion. Id. at 453–54 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62; United States v. Garcia-Meza,
403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005)).
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outside her home after discovering that she had started dating one of
his co-workers.112  When the prosecution sought to introduce a note
that the victim had written prior to her death implicating the defen-
dant in her murder, the defendant objected.113  He claimed that in-
troducing the note violated his confrontation right because the note
was testimonial, and he had not had the opportunity to cross-examine
the victim prior to her death.114  While the court agreed with the de-
fendant on this point, it rejected his larger Confrontation Clause argu-
ment by holding that the defendant had forfeited his confrontation
right when he killed the victim.115  Reasoning that sustaining the de-
fendant’s objection would “undermine[ ] the judicial process and
threaten[ ] the integrity of court proceedings,” the Sanchez court con-
cluded that the forfeiture doctrine was not limited to situations in
which a defendant killed a witness to prevent the witness from testify-
ing at trial.116
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Giles v. California,117 the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed the judgment of the California Supreme Court, concluding
that a defendant only forfeits the right to confront a witness who is
absent due to the defendant’s wrongful act when the defendant has
sought to silence the witness.118  Writing for the plurality,119 Justice
Scalia began by noting that the Sixth Amendment generally prohibits
the introduction of unconfronted witness testimony unless the situa-
tion satisfies one of the founding-era exceptions to the confrontation
112. Id. at 447.
113. Id. At trial, the defendant conceded that he had murdered the victim, but objected
to the jury instructions because he felt that they allowed the jurors to consider certain
sentencing factors indirectly. Id. at 447–48.
114. Id. at 451.
115. Id. at 453, 456.
116. Id. at 456.  The court further noted that “though courts may not vitiate constitu-
tional guarantees when they have the effect of allowing the guilty to go free . . . they [need
not] acquiesce in the destruction of the criminal-trial system’s integrity.” Id. (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 833).
117. 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
118. See id. at 2683, 2693 (refusing to recognize a modern forfeiture doctrine that is
broader than the forfeiture doctrine recognized at common law).
119. Although Justice Scalia garnered the support of a majority of the Court in conclud-
ing that the forfeiture doctrine contained a purpose-based intent limitation, only a plural-
ity of the Court supported his reasoning. See id. at 2681 (majority opinion) (noting that
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court except as to one part); id. at 2694 (Souter,
J., concurring) (noting that the historical record alone was insufficient to conclude that
the forfeiture doctrine contained a purpose-based intent limitation).  Thus, because only
three other Justices joined the entirety of Justice Scalia’s opinion, his reasoning effectively
became a plurality, rather than a majority, opinion. See id. at 2681–94 (plurality opinion).
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right.120  The plurality explained that the doctrine of forfeiture by
wrongdoing was one of those exceptions, but that the “most natural
reading”121 of the text in the founding-era forfeiture cases demon-
strated that the doctrine only applied where the defendant had the
purpose of causing the witness’s absence from trial.122  To arrive at
this conclusion, the plurality noted that the language of the founding-
era forfeiture cases embodied a purpose-based definition.123  For ex-
ample, it claimed that common-law courts frequently used the word
“procure” to describe the defendant’s action of keeping a witness
away, and that some dictionaries at the time defined “procure” as “to
contrive and effect,” indicating a purpose-based intent limitation.124
In its historical analysis, the plurality also noted that it had not
located any founding-era precedent admitting prior witness state-
ments on a forfeiture theory when the defendant had not sought to
prevent witness testimony through his wrongful act.125  In other
words, it reasoned that if the common-law forfeiture doctrine applied
regardless of the defendant’s state of mind, common-law judges and
prosecutors would have routinely invoked it to admit witness testi-
mony, which they did not do.126  The plurality then continued its his-
torical analysis by explaining that its review of the founding-era cases
in fact demonstrated that common-law courts uniformly excluded un-
confronted witness statements unless the prosecution could show that
the defendant removed the witness to prevent his testimony.127  Not-
ing that the forfeiture doctrine existed as a disincentive for defend-
ants to harm witnesses,128 the plurality also explained that it had
120. Id. at 2682 (plurality opinion).  As neither party disputed the issue, both the plural-
ity and dissent accepted without deciding that Avie’s prior statements to the police were
testimonial. Id.; id. at 2695 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Thomas and Alito concurred
in the plurality opinion, but each wrote separately, explaining that they did not believe
Avie’s statements were testimonial. Id. at 2693 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2694 (Alito,
J., concurring).
121. Id. at 2688 (plurality opinion).
122. Id. at 2683.
123. Id. at 2683–84.
124. Id. (emphasis added by the Court) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2
N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
125. Id. at 2688.
126. Id. at 2686.
127. Id. at 2688.  The plurality reasoned that the lack of judicial consideration of un-
available witness statements in common-law cases where defendants had not sought to si-
lence witnesses demonstrated that the forfeiture doctrine applied only where the
defendant desired to prevent a witness from testifying. Id. at 2684–85.
128. Id. at 2686, 2691.
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discovered no case prior to 1985 applying forfeiture without a pur-
pose-based intent limitation.129
Finding these considerations “conclusive,”130 the plurality then
rejected the dissent’s consideration of the forfeiture doctrine’s “basic
purposes and objectives”131 to justify its disagreement with the plural-
ity’s historical findings.132  The plurality described the boundaries of
the doctrine as “intelligently fixed” by history, noting that even if it
were to consider the principles suggested by the dissent, its analysis
would be unlikely to change.133  In doing so, the plurality also ex-
plained that positing a forfeiture doctrine without a purpose-based in-
tent limitation would essentially permit a judge, instead of a jury, to
determine a defendant’s guilt.134
After critiquing the dissent’s reasoning, the plurality concluded
that the forfeiture doctrine only applies when a defendant causes a
witness’s absence in order to silence the witness.135  In doing so, how-
ever, it noted special considerations that may apply in the domestic
violence context.136  Specifically, the plurality explained that prior
abuse or threats of abuse made to dissuade domestic violence victims
from seeking outside help might be relevant to determining whether
a defendant desired to prevent a witness from testifying.137
In a separate opinion, Justice Souter concurred in part, explain-
ing that he did not find the historical record alone sufficient to ascer-
tain the common-law limitations of the forfeiture doctrine in domestic
abuse cases.138  Instead, he emphasized the equitable rationale under-
lying the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine and reasoned that apply-
ing the doctrine without a purpose-based intent limitation would
129. Id. at 2687–88 (citing United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983 (11th Cir. 1985)).
130. Id. at 2688.
131. Id. at 2691 (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. See id. at 2691–92 (recognizing that “[t]he Sixth Amendment seeks fairness indeed”
but that it does so by looking to “the trial rights of [early common-law] Englishmen”).
133. Id. at 2691.
134. Id. (noting that a forfeiture doctrine that applies only when a defendant seeks to
prevent a witness from testifying avoids “a principle repugnant to our constitutional system
of trial by jury: that those murder defendants whom the judge considers guilty . . . should
be deprived of fair-trial rights, lest they benefit from their judge-determined wrong”).
135. Id. at 2683, 2693 (rejecting the dissent’s characterization of the plurality’s standard
as “knowledge-based intent” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
136. Id. at 2693.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2694–95 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[D]omestic abuse had no apparent signifi-
cance at the time of the Framing, and there is no early example of the forfeiture rule
operating in that circumstance.”).
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violate fundamental principles of fairness.139  In addition, Justice Sou-
ter noted that early cases and commentary demonstrated that a defen-
dant did not forfeit his confrontation right unless he attempted to
thwart the judicial process, which Justice Souter concluded only oc-
curred when a defendant sought to silence a witness.140  Finally, he
explained that an ongoing abusive relationship would normally sup-
port the inference that a domestic abuser desired to isolate the victim
from the judicial process, thus making the victim’s prior statements
admissible under the forfeiture doctrine.141
Justice Breyer dissented, contending that the plurality errone-
ously concluded that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine includes a
purpose-based intent limitation.142  Unlike the plurality,143 before
evaluating the forfeiture doctrine’s relevant history, Justice Breyer
noted that the doctrine rests “on essentially equitable grounds.”144
In his historical analysis, Justice Breyer contended that the broad
language of the founding-era cases indicated that the forfeiture doc-
trine applies based upon the known consequences, rather than the
purpose, of the defendant’s conduct.145  For example, citing Lord Mor-
ley’s Case146 and Reynolds v. United States,147 he explained that early for-
feiture cases focused on witnesses absent by the “means or
procurement”148 of the defendant or due to the “legitimate conse-
139. Id. at 2694 (explaining that introduction of an absent witness’s statement where the
defendant murdered the witness without seeking to silence her would result in “circularity”
because a judge would admit the statement based on the judge’s determination that the
defendant probably committed the murder).
140. Id. at 2694–95.
141. Id. at 2695.
142. Id. at 2700–01 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 2682 (plurality opinion) (noting immediately that its analysis would focus on
the forfeiture doctrine as a “founding-era exception to the confrontation right”).
144. Id. at 2695 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004)).
145. Id. at 2700–01.  Justice Breyer also rejected the plurality’s assertion that it was signif-
icant that common-law courts invoked forfeiture only in cases where defendants sought to
prevent witnesses from testifying. Id. at 2702.  Rather, Justice Breyer explained that com-
mon-law courts rarely invoked the forfeiture doctrine because, at common law, the forfei-
ture doctrine only applied to prior confronted testimony. See id. (noting that “the most
obvious reason” why common-law courts failed to invoke the forfeiture rule in murder
trials was because prior statements must have been taken in the defendant’s presence in
order to be admissible at trial).
146. 6 How. St. Tr. 769 (H.L. 1666).
147. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
148. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2696 (emphasis added by the dissent) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. at 771).
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quences”149 of the defendant’s act, neither of which suggested pur-
pose-based intent.150
Justice Breyer thus adduced that the plurality’s purpose-based in-
tent standard not only misinterpreted the text of early forfeiture
cases,151 but also failed to uphold the doctrine’s basic objective—to
prevent a defendant from taking advantage of his own wrong.152  He
reasoned that, particularly in cases of domestic violence, imposing a
purpose-based intent limitation on the forfeiture doctrine could per-
mit a domestic partner who made threats, caused violence, or even
murdered the victim “to avoid conviction for earlier crimes by taking
advantage of later ones.”153
In addition, Justice Breyer explained that placing a purpose-
based intent limitation on the forfeiture doctrine aggravated eviden-
tiary incongruities by excluding testimony merely because there was
no evidence that a defendant was focused on his future murder trial
when he killed a witness.154  He further reasoned that the standard
posited by the plurality would limit the amount of evidence that the
jury would hear by excluding the victim’s potentially relevant prior
testimonial statements.155  As a result, Justice Breyer concluded that
“no history, no underlying purpose, no administrative consideration,
and no constitutional principle” required the Court to adopt a pur-
pose-based intent limitation on the forfeiture by wrongdoing doc-
trine.156  Therefore, he posited that the forfeiture doctrine should
apply when a defendant knows that his wrongful act will make a wit-
ness unavailable to testify at trial.157
149. Id. at 2700 (emphasis added by the dissent) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158).
150. Id. at 2700–01.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2697.  To bolster his argument, Justice Breyer looked to related areas of law
that employ similar equitable principles to prevent defendants from gaining an advantage
when they have committed a wrongful act, particularly murder. See id. (examining com-
mon-law principles that prevent defendants who murder from collecting under the victims’
life insurance policies, irrespective of the defendants’ purpose in committing the murder).
153. Id. at 2709.
154. Id. at 2699.
155. Id. at 2708.
156. Id. at 2709.
157. See id. at 2700–01 (explaining that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine applies
based on the “known consequence”—rather than the desired consequences—of a defen-
dant’s actions (emphasis omitted)).
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IV. ANALYSIS
In Giles v. California, the Supreme Court concluded that the Sixth
Amendment prohibits the use of an absent witness’s unconfronted tes-
timony unless the defendant, seeking to prevent the witness from testi-
fying, has caused the witness’s absence.158  By mistakenly relying on a
historical analysis in reaching this conclusion,159 a plurality of the
Court conflated a waiver rationale with the forfeiture doctrine’s un-
derlying equitable principles160 and inadequately considered the utili-
tarian principles that inform the application of the doctrine.161  If the
plurality had instead considered these equitable and utilitarian princi-
ples, it would not have needed to retreat from its opinion and would
have instead posited a knowledge-based intent standard.162
In concluding that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine con-
tained a purpose-based intent limitation, the plurality erred by look-
ing primarily to the doctrine’s history—which is ambiguous at best.
Throughout its opinion, the plurality analyzed early common-law for-
feiture cases, determining that the doctrine’s history conclusively
demonstrated that the forfeiture doctrine only applied where a defen-
dant sought to silence a witness.163  After reaching this conclusion, the
plurality then proceeded to attack the dissent for looking beyond the
forfeiture doctrine’s history to support its analysis.164  A reading of the
entire opinion, however, quickly demonstrates that the history of the
doctrine is anything but conclusive, particularly as the plurality and
dissent each painstakingly examined the language of the same cases,
158. See id. at 2683, 2693 (majority opinion) (explaining that common-law courts em-
ployed the forfeiture doctrine only when a defendant engaged in conduct to prevent a
witness from testifying and that the Court would not approve a modern forfeiture doctrine
broader than the one existing at common law).  As previously noted, although a majority
of the Court endorsed a forfeiture doctrine containing a purpose-based limitation, only a
plurality of the Court supported Justice Scalia’s reasoning. See supra note 119. R
159. See infra Part IV.
160. See infra Part IV.A.
161. See infra Part IV.B.
162. See infra Part IV.C.
163. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2688 (plurality opinion) (describing its historical analysis as “con-
clusive” in determining the scope of the forfeiture doctrine).
164. See id. at 2691 (“Having destroyed its own case, the dissent issues a thinly veiled
invitation to . . . adopt an approach . . . under which the Court would create the exceptions
that it thinks consistent with the policies underlying the confrontation guarantee, regard-
less of how that guarantee was historically understood.”); Josephine Ross, When Murder
Alone Is Not Enough:  Forfeiture of the Confrontation Clause After Giles, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2009,
at 34, 36 (“In Part II-D-2, Justice Scalia attacked the dissent for basing its decision on equity
grounds instead of the history of confrontation.”).
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yet reached opposite conclusions about its meaning.165  In fact, a ma-
jority of the Justices acknowledged the ambiguity of the forfeiture
cases, further indicating that reliance on history alone is insufficient
to determine the contours of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doc-
trine.166  As a result, the plurality erred in concentrating on a histori-
cal analysis, rather than looking to the forfeiture doctrine’s other
underlying considerations, in reaching its conclusion.167
A. The Plurality Conflated a Waiver Rationale with the Forfeiture
Doctrine’s Underlying Equitable Principles
By holding that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine contained
a purpose-based intent limitation, the plurality conflated the doc-
trine’s equitable foundation with a waiver rationale.  Waiver theory,
briefly used as a justification for the forfeiture doctrine, is based on a
defendant’s intentional decision to relinquish the protection of his
confrontation right.168  In effect, waiver theory requires that the de-
fendant have his future trial in mind at the time he acts in order for
forfeiture of confrontation rights to occur.169  As a result of this re-
quirement, some courts relying on waiver theory have imposed an in-
165. For example, the plurality cites the “means or procurement” test employed by the
court in Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 771 (H.L. 1666), to support its proposition
that the forfeiture doctrine contained a purpose-based intent limitation. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at
2683.  The dissent then employs the same phrase to support its conclusion that forfeiture
requires knowledge-based intent rather than purpose-based intent. Id. at 2696 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
166. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining that the historical
record revealed by the plurality and dissent’s exchange was insufficient to reach a conclu-
sion about the forfeiture doctrine’s limitations); id. at 2704, 2707 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(explaining that there may be “too few old records available for us to draw firm conclu-
sions” and the fact that judges will employ different interpretations is “[a]ll the more rea-
son then not to reach firm conclusions about the precise metes and bounds of a
contemporary forfeiture exception by trying to guess the state of mind of 18th century
lawyers”).
167. See Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing Their
Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 892 (2009) (noting the historical, equitable, and utilitarian
considerations that inform the modern forfeiture doctrine and reasoning that a narrow
focus on only one rationale could jeopardize the longevity of the forfeiture doctrine).
168. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (“[W]aiver is ordinarily an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”); Diaz v. United States, 223
U.S. 442, 451 (1912) (“The defendant undoubtedly had a constitutional right to be con-
fronted with his witnesses.  He waived that right in this case, apparently for his own sup-
posed advantage and to obtain evidence on his own behalf.”); see also supra Part II.B.2.
169. See Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1201 n.8 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting that the con-
cept of waiver is a legal fiction based on purposeful consideration and understanding of
future consequences at the time the defendant commits the wrongful act).
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tent-to-silence limitation on the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.170
Such a limitation assumes that the forfeiture doctrine exists to place
defendants on notice about a potential witness and to inform the de-
fendant that harming the witness will result in a relinquishment of the
defendant’s confrontation right.171  Based on this rationale, when a
defendant does not act with notice that a person will testify at his trial
and with the intent to abandon his right to confront that person, the
defendant cannot forfeit his confrontation right.172
This interpretation, however, does not comport with the Court’s
recent reiteration that the forfeiture doctrine rests in equity.173  Be-
cause equitable principles serve as the doctrine’s basis, courts must
look not to whether a defendant had notice that he would forfeit a
constitutional right, but must instead look to whether a defendant
would profit from his wrongful act if the absent witness’s statement is
not admitted.174  Where the defendant would derive a benefit from
his wrongful act, equity demands that the defendant must forfeit his
confrontation right, even if he acted without the desire to prevent the
witness from testifying at trial.175
In its opinion, the plurality erroneously invoked a waiver ratio-
nale to justify its conclusion that the forfeiture doctrine contained a
purpose-based intent limitation.  Criticizing the dissent for its consid-
170. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1982) (concluding that
a defendant who murdered a witness to prevent the witness from testifying against the
defendant “waived” his confrontation right).
171. See United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279–80 (1st Cir. 1996) (discussing the
forfeiture doctrine and waiver theory and noting that the intent-to-silence requirement
provides this notice), noted in People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 443 (Cal. 2007).
172. See Thevis, 665 F.2d at 630 (explaining that a defendant waives his confrontation
right only when he procures a witness’s absence with the understanding that his action will
cause him to relinquish that right).
173. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (explaining that the forfeiture
by wrongdoing doctrine extinguishes confrontation rights on “essentially equitable
grounds”).  The plurality’s interpretation also contradicts the very idea of forfeiture itself,
which is the loss of a constitutional right based on a defendant’s misconduct, not a defen-
dant’s intentional decision to relinquish that right. See Ralph Ruebner & Eugene Goryu-
nov, Giles v. California: Sixth Amendment Confrontation Right, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, and a
Misguided Departure from the Common Law and the Constitution, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 577, 588
(2009) (emphasizing that forfeiture does not require that a defendant make a “deliberate,
informed decision to relinquish [his rights]” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
174. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 159 (1879) (noting that the forfeiture
doctrine rests on the maxim that “no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own
wrong”).
175. See United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370–71 (6th Cir. 2005) (considering
the equitable basis of the forfeiture doctrine and concluding that a defendant had for-
feited his right to confront his ex-girlfriend by killing her in an act of domestic violence
even though the defendant did not act to prevent the victim from testifying).
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eration of the forfeiture doctrine’s “basic purposes and objectives,”176
the plurality explained that the forfeiture doctrine existed solely to
provide a disincentive for defendants to harm witnesses.177  Such a
justification, however, improperly rests on waiver principles by defin-
ing forfeiture as a mechanism to put defendants on notice that they
will relinquish their confrontation right if they seek to obtain an ad-
vantage at trial.178  As a result, to justify the forfeiture by wrongdoing
doctrine, the plurality effectively reverted to a waiver rationale, which
the Court had previously repudiated when it concluded that the for-
feiture doctrine rests in equity.179
The plurality thus overlooked entirely the equitable principles
underlying the forfeiture doctrine and posited a standard that essen-
tially permits defendants to take advantage of their own wrongful acts
by excluding inculpatory statements of absent witnesses.180  In effect,
the plurality’s purpose-based intent standard allows defendants to use
the Sixth Amendment as a shield from their own misconduct,181 an
action that courts have long found to be contrary to the interests of
justice.182
B. The Plurality Inadequately Addressed the Utilitarian Principles that
Inform the Application of the Modern Forfeiture Doctrine
In holding that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine applies
only when a defendant has sought to prevent a witness from testifying,
176. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2691 (2008) (plurality opinion) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
177. Id.
178. See People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 442–43 (Cal. 2007) (explaining that placing an
intent-to-silence requirement on the forfeiture doctrine is an erroneous characterization of
forfeiture as waiver).
179. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (“[T]he rule of forfeiture by
wrongdoing . . . extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds . . . .”).
180. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2697 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that the plurality’s
interpretation fails to recognize the “basic purposes,” that is, the equitable nature, of the
forfeiture doctrine).  In fact, Justice Scalia himself appears to acknowledge that the plural-
ity disregarded the equitable principles underlying the forfeiture doctrine: “If we were to
reason from the ‘basic purposes and objectives’ of the forfeiture doctrine, we are not at all
sure we would come to the dissent’s favored result.” Id. at 2691 (plurality opinion) (em-
phasis added).
181. See United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985) (“‘The Sixth Amend-
ment does not stand as a shield to protect the accused from his own misconduct or chican-
ery.’” (quoting United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976))).
182. See Harrison’s Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 833, 835–36 (H.L. 1692) (explaining that pro-
curing a witness’s absence was “a very ill thing” and that the court would not permit the
witness’s absence to benefit the defendant); Queen v. Scaife, (1851) 117 Eng. Rep. 1271,
1272 (Q.B.) (noting that “justice” would not allow a defendant to take advantage of his
procurement of a witness’s absence (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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the plurality inadequately addressed the utilitarian principles that for-
feiture cases have long emphasized.  As a result, the plurality’s pur-
pose-based intent standard compromised both the truth-seeking
function of the trial process and the integrity of court proceedings.
It is well-established that the mission of the Confrontation Clause
is to “advance the accuracy of the truth-seeking process in criminal
trials.”183  This mission, however, carries with it the explicit recogni-
tion that the confrontation right may be limited when a defendant
attempts to use it in a way that would sacrifice the rights of the public
or undermine the criminal justice system.184  Although many of the
forfeiture by wrongdoing cases that utilize utilitarian principles to
limit the confrontation right involve overt attempts to prevent witness
testimony,185 courts employing these principles have not limited their
application to cases in which a defendant sought to silence a wit-
ness.186  As a result, utilitarian principles can influence the application
of the forfeiture doctrine even when a defendant whose wrongful act
caused a witness’s unavailability did not desire to prevent the witness
from testifying.187
183. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 396 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985)); see also Kentucky v. Stincer, 482
U.S. 730, 737 (1987) (noting that a defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses is a “func-
tional right designed to promote reliability in the truth-finding functions of a criminal
trial” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43
(1895) (explaining that the primary object of the Confrontation Clause is to allow the jury
to see witnesses in order to determine whether their testimony is worthy of belief).
184. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243; Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1359 (explaining that notions of public
policy and the administration of the justice system must enter into the resolution of forfei-
ture cases).
185. See, e.g., Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1201–02 (6th Cir. 1982) (employing the
forfeiture doctrine when defendants sought to prevent a witness’s inculpatory testimony
through various means); Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1359–60 (utilizing the doctrine to admit a
witness’s prior testimony after the defendant intimidated the witness to prevent him from
testifying).
186. For example, in Steele v. Taylor, although the court compared the case to other cases
in which the defendants sought to prevent testimony, the court alluded to a broader forfei-
ture rule that would admit prior witness statements when a defendant’s wrongful conduct
made a witness unavailable. See Steele, 684 F.2d at 1202 (“A prior statement given by a
witness made unavailable by the wrongful conduct of a party is admissible against the party
if the statement would have been admissible had the witness testified.”).  Similarly, the
court in United States v. Carlson focused on the witness’s absence as a result of the defen-
dant’s wrongful acts, irrespective of whether the defendant acted with the purpose of
preventing testimony. See Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1359 (“Nor should the law permit an accused
to subvert a criminal prosecution by causing witnesses not to testify at trial who have, at the
pretrial stage, disclosed information which is inculpatory as to the accused.”).
187. See State v. Sanchez, 177 P.3d 444, 456 (Mont. 2008) (noting that permitting a
defendant who murdered his ex-girlfriend to invoke the protection of the Confrontation
Clause would threaten the integrity of court proceedings, even though the defendant did
not commit the murder in order to stop the victim from testifying).
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The plurality, however, failed to consider these principles in its
analysis.188  Nowhere in its opinion did the plurality seriously examine
the implications of its purpose-based intent standard on public policy
and the administration of justice,189 two long-standing components of
utilitarian principles.190  Specifically, the plurality summarily dis-
missed the suggestion that its purpose-based intent standard could ac-
tually hinder the criminal trial process by excluding relevant
information from the jury’s consideration.191  In so doing, the plural-
ity disregarded the fact that the disclosure of relevant information,
such as inculpatory witness testimony, is a “paramount interest” at
trial, such that any significant interference with that interest consti-
tutes a wrongful act.192  As a result, the plurality failed to consider that
a defendant whose wrongful act causes a witness’s unavailability at trial
has interfered with that “paramount interest” to an extent that de-
mands the admission of the absent witness’s prior statements at
trial.193
In addition to disregarding the importance of disclosing relevant
information at trial, the plurality ignored the impact of its purpose-
based intent standard on the integrity of trial proceedings.194  The
plurality did not address the fact that its standard permits defendants
to subvert their criminal prosecutions by presenting only one self-serv-
ing side of the story to the jury.195  Courts, however, have long looked
to such a consideration when applying the forfeiture by wrongdoing
188. See Lininger, supra note 167, at 892 (explaining that the plurality’s “exclusively R
originalist conception of forfeiture” resulted in a standard that offends utilitarian
sensibilities).
189. Id.; see Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2678–93 (2008) (plurality opinion).
190. See United States v. Mattox, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (explaining that a defendant’s
confrontation right must occasionally yield to considerations of public policy); Carlson, 547
F.2d at 1359 (noting that courts must consider the effective administration of justice when
determining whether a defendant has forfeited his confrontation right).
191. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2692 n.7 (briefly noting that its purpose-based intent standard
intentionally limited the introduction of evidence by the prosecution without imposing a
corresponding limitation on the evidence that a defendant could introduce).
192. Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1201 (6th Cir. 1982).
193. See id. (noting that wrongful nondisclosure of information is a substantial interfer-
ence with the “paramount interest” of disclosing relevant information at trial); People v.
Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 444 (Cal. 2007) (explaining that courts should be able to advance the
truth-seeking function of the trial process by allowing the jury to hear relevant evidence
that the defendant’s actions have made unavailable through live testimony).
194. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) (discussing a defendant’s duty to
refrain from destroying the integrity of criminal trials by procuring the absence of
witnesses).
195. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2699 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that the plurality’s
standard permits an abuser to testify at length and “in damning detail” about the victim’s
behavior “as he remembers [it],” without generally permitting the victim to reply).
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doctrine,196 noting that the Sixth Amendment does not oblige courts
to acquiesce when defendants undermine the judicial process in such
a way.197  By failing to consider the importance of maintaining the
integrity of court proceedings and providing jurors with relevant in-
formation at trial, the plurality inadequately addressed the utilitarian
principles that impact the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.
In fact, the plurality’s one cursory attempt to invoke utilitarian
principles to support its purpose-based intent standard failed at the
first step.  The plurality claimed that use of a forfeiture by wrongdoing
doctrine without a purpose-based intent limitation would undermine
the criminal trial system by permitting a judge, rather than a jury, to
determine a defendant’s guilt.198  But such a conclusion rests on a
faulty premise.  Contrary to the plurality’s assertions, any forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine would require a judge to determine whether a
defendant’s wrongful act caused the witness’s unavailability before ad-
mitting an absent witness’s prior statements.199  This determination,
however, would not remove a defendant’s right to a trial by jury be-
cause jurors would never learn of the judge’s preliminary determina-
tion in admitting the evidence at trial.200  In fact, judges have long
made such preliminary determinations of guilt before admitting incul-
196. See United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting that the
law will not permit a defendant to cloak himself in constitutional and procedural safe-
guards while “‘defy[ing]’” with impunity the processes of the law and “‘paralyz[ing]’”
courtroom and jury proceedings (quoting Diaz v. United States, 233 U.S. 442, 458
(1912))).
197. See State v. Sanchez, 177 P.3d 444, 456 (Mont. 2008) (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 833)
(explaining that a purpose-based intent standard would permit certain defendants who
commit intentional criminal acts resulting in a victim’s death to use the death to exclude
the victim’s admissible testimony, thereby subverting the judicial process).  The Davis
Court’s reference to defendants who “‘seek to undermine the judicial process by procur-
ing or coercing’” witness silence does not change the conclusion that the forfeiture doc-
trine applies when a defendant knowingly causes a witness’s absence from trial. See Giles,
152 P.3d at 443 n.5 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 833) (explaining that
while this language may have described the traditional form of witness tampering cases, it
did not limit the forfeiture doctrine to witness tampering cases alone, particularly because
the Davis Court reiterated the equitable basis of the forfeiture doctrine).
198. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2691–92 (plurality opinion).
199. Id. at 2707 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The plurality appears to concede this point
when noting that its own standard would “sometimes” require a judge to determine
whether a defendant sought to prevent a witness’s testimony before admitting that wit-
ness’s prior statements. Id. at 2692 n.6 (plurality opinion).
200. See United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (explaining
that a preliminary judicial determination of guilt does not violate a defendant’s right to a
jury trial because the jury “will never learn of the judge’s preliminary finding” and the jury
“will use different information and a different standard of proof to decide the defendant’s
guilt”).
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patory testimony.201  Therefore, the plurality’s fleeting reference to
the utilitarian principles influencing the forfeiture doctrine fails to
support its own case for a purpose-based intent standard, merely rein-
forcing the observation that the plurality inadequately addressed
these principles in reaching its conclusion.202
C. If It Had Considered Equitable and Utilitarian Principles, the
Plurality Would Not Have Needed to Retreat from Its Opinion
and Would Have Instead Posited a Knowledge-Based
Intent Standard
As a result of its failure to consider the equitable and utilitarian
principles underlying the forfeiture doctrine, the plurality posited a
purpose-based intent standard from which it had to retreat at the end
of its opinion.203  If the plurality had instead considered these equita-
ble and utilitarian principles in its analysis, it would have posited a
knowledge-based intent standard from which it would not have
needed to withdraw.204
1. The Tension Between the Plurality’s Purpose-Based Intent
Standard and the Doctrine’s Underlying Equitable and
Utilitarian Principles Caused the Plurality to Retreat
from Its Own Opinion
Although the plurality concluded that the forfeiture by wrongdo-
ing doctrine applied only when a defendant sought to silence an ab-
201. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2707 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  In addition to forfeiture cases,
judges have also routinely made preliminary findings of guilt in conspiracy cases. See
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175–76 (1987) (permitting a judge to make an
initial finding regarding the existence of a conspiracy in order to determine whether a co-
conspirator’s statement can be admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule).  The
plurality attempts to distinguish Bourjaily on the ground that it does not implicate the
Confrontation Clause. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2692 n.6 (plurality opinion) (explaining that
the statement in Bourjaily was not testimonial).  This effort, however, necessarily fails be-
cause Bourjaily stands for the proposition that a judge can make an initial determination of
a defendant’s guilt without violating the defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial.
Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175–76.  It is this proposition, not one relating to the defendant’s
confrontation right, with which the plurality takes issue when declaring that the knowl-
edge-based intent standard posited by the dissent would sacrifice a defendant’s right to a
jury trial. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2691–92 & n.6; Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 181 (separately ad-
dressing the defendant’s Confrontation Clause objection after determining that the trial
court could make a preliminary determination of the defendant’s guilt).
202. See Lininger, supra note 167, at 892 (acknowledging the plurality’s failure to ad- R
dress adequately the utilitarian principles impacting the forfeiture doctrine).
203. See infra Part IV.C.1.
204. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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sent witness,205 it retreated from this standard at the end of its
opinion.206  Specifically, in its conclusion, the plurality unexpectedly
addressed the application of its standard to the context of domestic
violence, noting that a history of domestic violence could satisfy its
stringent purpose-based intent standard without requiring a showing
that the defendant desired to prevent the witness from testifying.207
Although it repeatedly asserted that founding-era cases alone serve as
the touchstone for the modern forfeiture doctrine,208 the plurality did
not cite to a single case in its opinion as an illustration of domestic
violence.209  Therefore, the plurality’s sudden discussion of domestic
violence at the end of its opinion is inconsistent with the remainder of
its opinion, which relied upon the analysis of early common-law forfei-
ture cases to demonstrate the strict confines of the forfeiture
doctrine.210
The tension between the plurality’s purpose-based intent stan-
dard and the equitable and utilitarian principles that inform the for-
feiture doctrine’s application drove this retreat.211  As previously
discussed, the plurality’s analysis failed to examine diligently any ratio-
nale other than history.212  As a result of its reliance upon an “exclu-
sively” historical analysis, the plurality posited a purpose-based
standard that contradicted both equitable and utilitarian princi-
205. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683, 2693 (explaining that the common-law forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine applied only when a defendant’s conduct was “designed” to prevent a
witness from testifying and that the Court would not approve a doctrine broader than the
one existing at common law).
206. See id. at 2693 (explaining how the standard may operate differently in cases involv-
ing domestic violence).
207. See id. (noting that evidence of an abusive relationship resulting in a murder “may
support a finding that the crime expressed the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her
from reporting abuse to the authorities” and that such evidence would result in the defen-
dant’s forfeiture of his confrontation right).
208. Id. at 2682–83, 2692.
209. See id. at 2681–93.  In fact, the plurality did not even employ the phrase “domestic
violence” until the end of its opinion, when it abruptly began discussing the implications of
its forfeiture doctrine for domestic violence cases. Id. at 2693.
210. See Lininger, supra note 167, at 886 (explaining that the plurality’s discussion of the R
forfeiture doctrine in the domestic violence context “seemed at odds with the preceding
analysis in which Scalia had repeatedly insisted upon proof of specific intent to thwart
testimony”); see also David G. Savage, Justices Side with Accused, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2008, at
A19 (describing as “puzzling” the plurality’s discussion of forfeiture in the domestic vio-
lence context).  In fact, the dissent also seemed to recognize this inconsistency. See Giles,
128 S. Ct. at 2708 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the plurality’s apparent use of a
knowledge-based intent standard in domestic violence cases).
211. See supra Part IV.A–B for discussion of the plurality’s disregard of these equitable
and utilitarian principles.
212. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2691–92 (plurality opinion) (criticizing the dissent for look-
ing beyond the forfeiture doctrine’s history to determine the boundaries of the doctrine).
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ples.213  Apparently recognizing this tension and the need to mollify
those who would criticize its standard as unjust, the plurality had to
backpedal from its stringent purpose-based standard.214  By briefly ex-
plaining the ways that a history of domestic abuse could permit a pros-
ecutor to sidestep the plurality’s strict standard, the plurality thus
retreated from its own opinion, attempting to compensate for its ear-
lier disregard for the forfeiture doctrine’s underlying equitable and
utilitarian rationales.215
2. If It Had Considered These Equitable and Utilitarian Principles in
Its Analysis, the Plurality Would Have Posited a Knowledge-
Based Intent Standard
The plurality would have appropriately preserved the equitable
and utilitarian rationales for the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine if
it had posited a knowledge-based intent standard.  First, concluding
that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine applies when a defendant
knows, rather than desires, that his wrongful act will prevent a wit-
ness’s testimony ensures that a defendant does not profit from his
wrongdoing,216 a concept emphasized by courts for centuries.217  Such
a standard thus precludes defendants from excluding inculpatory wit-
ness testimony and from using the Sixth Amendment as a shield from
their own misconduct.218  The standard also rejects the theory that the
forfeiture doctrine exists to place defendants on notice that they will
relinquish their confrontation rights by causing a witness to be absent
from trial.219  As a result, use of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine
213. See Lininger, supra note 167, at 892 (describing the purpose-based intent standard R
resulting from the plurality’s “narrow” historical focus as “untenable” when compared to
the doctrine’s underlying equitable and utilitarian principles); see also supra Part IV.A–B.
214. See Lininger, supra note 167, at 887 (“The first 90% of the opinion[ ] set forth R
originalist analysis . . . .  [But t]he last 10% then [sought] to assure the liberal Justices that
more confrontation in court will not mean more confrontation at home.”).
215. See supra Part IV.A–B.
216. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2699 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that inequity results
when a defendant knows that his wrongful action will cause a witness’s absence at trial and
the defendant acts nonetheless).
217. See, e.g., Harrison’s Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 833, 835–36 (H.L. 1692) (refusing to allow
a witness’s absence to “conduce to [the defendant’s] advantage” when the defendant pro-
cured the witness’s absence from trial).
218. See United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985) (“‘The Sixth Amend-
ment does not stand as a shield to protect the accused from his own misconduct or chican-
ery.’” (quoting United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976))).
219. See People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 443 (Cal. 2007)  (explaining that placing an in-
tent-to-silence limitation on the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine incorrectly assumes that
the forfeiture doctrine exists in order to place defendants on notice that they will relin-
quish their confrontation rights by procuring the absence of witnesses at trial).
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when a defendant has knowingly caused a witness’s absence from trial
comports with the Court’s recent affirmation of the forfeiture doc-
trine’s equitable basis.220
In addition, a knowledge-based intent standard furthers the utili-
tarian principles underlying the forfeiture doctrine.221  It advances
the truth-seeking function of the trial system by allowing the jury to
hear relevant evidence that a defendant has made unavailable.222  Em-
ploying the forfeiture doctrine when a defendant has wrongfully
caused a witness’s absence from trial also protects the integrity of trial
proceedings.223  Specifically, it limits a defendant’s ability to succeed
in presenting a one-sided story to the jury when the defendant’s own
wrongful act has prevented a witness from providing the jury with
more complete information.224  As a result, a knowledge-based intent
standard ensures that courts do not acquiesce when a defendant’s
wrongful act risks undermining the judicial process.225  Thus, if the
plurality had considered these equitable and utilitarian principles, it
would not have needed to retreat from its own opinion because it
would have appropriately considered the full scope of the rationales
underlying the forfeiture doctrine.226
220. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) (noting that the forfeiture doc-
trine “‘extinguishes’” a defendant’s confrontation right on “‘equitable grounds’” (quoting
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004))).  A knowledge-based intent standard
would also align with related areas of law that employ equitable principles to prevent
wrongdoers from benefiting from their wrongful acts. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2697 (likening
the equitable principles underlying the forfeiture doctrine to those underlying property
and insurance laws, which prohibit a person who wrongfully kills another, regardless of
motive, from inheriting under the decedent’s will or receiving funds from the decedent’s
life insurance contract).
221. See, e.g., Giles, 152 P.3d at 443–44 (explaining that utilizing the forfeiture by wrong-
doing doctrine when a defendant knowingly and wrongfully causes a witness’s absence
from trial protects the integrity of courtroom proceedings).
222. See Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1201–02 (6th Cir. 1982) (explaining that the
disclosure of relevant information to a jury serves a “paramount interest” and reasoning
that a defendant’s wrongful nondisclosure of information at trial, such as by procuring a
witness’s absence, constitutes an interference with that interest).
223. Giles, 152 P.3d at 444.
224. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2699 (decrying the fact that, aside from evidentiary considera-
tions, a purpose-based intent standard would permit a defendant to testify “in damning
detail” about the victim’s actions while excluding the victim’s relevant testimony).
225. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 (explaining that the Sixth Amendment does not oblige
courts to acquiesce when defendants undermine the judicial process by wrongfully causing
a witness’s absence at trial).
226. See Lininger, supra note 167, at 892 (noting that only by acknowledging each of the R
forfeiture doctrine’s underlying rationales—history, equity, and utility—can the forfeiture
doctrine achieve its objectives).
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V. CONCLUSION
In Giles v. California, the Supreme Court improperly concluded
that a defendant forfeits his right to confront an absent witness only
when the defendant has sought to prevent the witness from testify-
ing.227  In so concluding, a plurality of the Court mistakenly focused
on a historical analysis when it posited a purpose-based intent stan-
dard.228  As a result, the plurality conflated a waiver rationale with the
forfeiture doctrine’s underlying equitable principles229 and essentially
disregarded the utilitarian principles that inform the application of
the doctrine,230 thus causing the plurality to retreat from its own opin-
ion.231  If the plurality had instead looked to these equitable and utili-
tarian principles, it would have posited a knowledge-based intent
standard that focused on the forfeiture of confrontation rights rather
than a purpose-based intent standard that results in the forfeiture of
justice.232
227. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683, 2693 (majority opinion) (explaining that the forfeiture
doctrine applied at common law only when a defendant engaged in conduct “designed” to
prevent a witness from testifying and that the Court would not approve a doctrine broader
than the one existing at common law); see also supra note 119. R
228. See supra Part IV.
229. See supra Part IV.A.
230. See supra Part IV.B.
231. See supra Part IV.C.1.
232. See supra Part IV.C.2.
